Abstract-We present a new inductive proof rule for reasoning about lower bounds on weakest preexpectations, i.e., expected values of random variables after execution of a probabilistic loop. Our rule is simple in the sense that the semantics of the loop needs to be applied to a candidate lower bound only a finite number of times in order to verify that the candidate is indeed a lower bound. We do not require finding the limit of a sequence as many previous rules did. Furthermore, and also in contrast to existing rules, we do not require the random variables to be bounded.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study probabilistic programs featuring discrete probabilistic choices such as { C 1 } [p] { C 2 }, i.e., the program C 1 is executed with probability p and C 2 is executed with probability 1 − p. Apart from probabilistic choice, we support usual constructs such as assignments, conditional branching, sequential composition, and unbounded loops. Describing randomized algorithms has been the classical application of probabilistic programs. Recently, however, applications in biology, quantum computing, cyber security, and in particular machine learning and artificial intelligence have led to a rapidly growing interest in probabilistic programming [1] , [2] , [22] .
Although probabilistic programs are typically relatively small in practice, reasoning about their correctness is intricate and in general strictly harder than reasoning about nonprobabilistic programs [30] , [32] . The basic notion of program termination exemplifies this: Whereas nonprobabilistic programs either terminate or not, probabilistic programs may terminate with a probability between 0 and 1. Furthermore, whereas nonprobabilistic programs either terminate in finitely many steps or diverge, the expected runtime of a probabilistic program may be infinite, even if its termination probability is 1.
Establishing correctness of probabilistic programs requires formal reasoning. Predicate transformer calculià la Dijkstra [17] , [18] provide an important tool to enable qualitative formal reasoning for nonprobabilistic programs. To develop analogous calculi for probabilistic programs, one has to take into account that the final state of a probabilistic program need not be unique. Thus, instead of mapping inputs to outputs, probabilistic programs map initial states to a probability distribution over final states. More precisely, they yield subdistributions where the "missing" probability mass represents the probability of nontermination.
The probabilistic and quantitative analog to predicate transformers for nonprobabilistic programs are expectation transformers for probabilistic programs (cf. [25] , [38] , [39] , [42] , [46] ). Random variables f mapping program states to nonnegative real values (e.g., f = x 2 + y 2 , where x and y are program variables), are commonly called expectations. 1 Given expectation f , initial state s, and probabilistic program C, a key issue is to determine the expected value of f after termination of C on input s. A mapping from initial states to corresponding expected values is commonly called a weakest preexpectation (in analogy to Dijkstra's weakest preconditions, as it is evaluated in initial states), whereas in this context, f is called the postexpectation (in analogy to Dijkstra's postconditions, as it is evaluated in final states). If f is the indicator function of an event A, then the weakest preexpectation of C with respect to f represents the probability that A has occurred after termination of C. As another example, the weakest preexpectation of C with respect to the constant function f = 1 represents the probability that C terminates. Note that while the latter two postexpectations f were bounded as they map to the interval [0, 1], the postexpectation f = x 2 + y 2 from above is potentially unbounded, i.e., it maps to R ≥0 . Weakest-preexpectation-style reasoning was first studied in Kozen's seminal work on probabilistic propositional dynamic logic (PPDL) [38] , [39] . Its box-and diamond-modalities provide probabilistic versions of Dijkstra's weakest (liberal) preconditions. Amongst others, Jones [28] , Hehner [25] , and McIver & Morgan [42] have furthered this line of research, e.g., by considering nondeterminism and proof rules for loops. Recently, Kaminski et al. [33] , [34] presented expectation transformer reasoning about the expected runtimes while Batz et al. [8] consider a quantitative separation logic together with a weakest preexpectation calculus for verifying probabilistic programs with dynamic memory.
Most of the above-mentioned works share a common technique: an induction rule for proving upper bounds on weakest preexpectations of loops, which are characterized as the least fixed point of an appropriate expectation transformer Φ. This induction proof principle (called "Park induction") reads
i.e., we check Φ(I) ⊑ I for a suitable partial order ⊑ to prove that I is indeed an upper bound on the sought-after least fixed point. We call such a candidate I for a bound on a weakest preexpectation an invariant. 2 Note that reasoning about upper bounds by induction is conceptually relatively easy.
Apart from upper bounds, there is a genuine interest in reasoning about lower bounds as well. In general, lower bounds help to assess the quality and tightness of upper bounds. Moreover, giving total correctness guarantees amounts to lower-bounding the correctness probability, e.g., for proving membership in complexity classes like RP and PP. Furthermore, lower bounds on expected resource consumption reveal the existence of certain attacks: if a lower bound on an expected runtime depends on a secret program variable, this may compromise the secret, thus allowing for timing sidechannel attacks. In addition, a "large" lower bound indicates the possibility of denial-of-service attacks.
A simple proof principle analogous to induction, namely
is unsound in general. Sound proof rules for lower bounds, on the other hand, often suffer from the fact that postexpectations need to be bounded [42] , or that one has to find the limit of an appropriate sequence of expectations, as well as the sequence itself [3] , [31] , [33] , [34] , [48] , [49] . In the latter case, the resulting proof rules are conceptually much more involved than the induction principle for upper bounds.
In this paper, we study relatively simple additional constraints that can be added to the premise of the (unsound) implication above, such that this implication becomes true. We thus obtain a simple inductive proof rule for proving lower bounds on weakest preexpectations in a compositional manner.
Our rule will rely on the notions of uniform integrability and conditional difference boundedness as well as the Optional Stopping Theorem. Previous works have also used these notions. Barthe et al. [7] focus on synthesizing exact martingale expressions. Hermanns & Fioriti [20] develop a type system for uniform integrability in order to prove (positive) almostsure termination of probabilistic programs and give upper bounds on the expected runtime. Chatterjee & Fu [12] give lower bounds on expected runtimes. Kobayashi et al. [37] provide a semi-decision procedure for lower bounding termination probabilities of probabilistic higher-order recursive programs. Ngo et al. [47] perform automated template-driven resource analysis, but infer upper bounds only. The latter four works only analyze the termination behavior of a probabilistic program, whereas we focus on general expected values. More importantly and in contrast to many previous works, we do not only make use of uniform integrability and/or conditional difference boundedness of some auxiliary stochastic process in order to prove soundness of our proof rule. Instead, we 1) establish a notion of uniform integrability and conditional difference boundedness purely in terms of expectations and expectation transformers,
2) construct a canonical stochastic process corresponding to a given loop, a postexpectation, and an invariant, and show its relationship to the sought-after preexpectation, 3) show that uniform integrability of an invariant in the expectation transformer sense corresponds to uniform integrability of the corresponding canonical stochastic process in the classical probability theoretic sense, and 4) present a purely expectation transformer counterpart to the classical Optional Stopping Theorem. The latter then yields an inductive proof rule for lower bounds on arbitrary and even unbounded weakest preexpectations.
Organization of the paper: In Section II, we give a primer on weakest preexpectation reasoning. In Section III, we revisit techniques for reasoning about loops and give a more elaborate problem statement. Moreover, we develop the notion of uniform integrability in terms of expectation transformers. In Section IV, we provide preliminaries on probability theory and instantiate these notions in our setting. In particular, we present our construction of the canonical stochastic process mentioned above. In Section V, we develop our main result: An Optional Stopping Theorem for weakest preexpectation reasoning, yielding a simple inductive proof rule for lower bounds on weakest preexpectations of loops. In Section VI, we revisit upper bounds and, using Fatou's Lemma, obtain an alternative explanation on why reasoning about upper bounds is easier. The appendix contains case studies to illustrate the effectiveness of our proof rule and the proofs of our results.
II. WEAKEST PREEXPECTATION REASONING
Weakest preexpectations for probabilistic programs are a generalization of Dijkstra's weakest preconditions for nonprobabilistic programs. Dijkstra employs predicate transformers, which push a postcondition F (a predicate) backward through a nonprobabilistic program C and yield the weakest precondition G (another predicate) describing the largest set of states such that whenever C is started in a state satisfying G, C terminates in a state satisfying F . 3 The weakest preexpecation calculus on the other hand employs expectation transformers which act on real-valued functions called expectations, mapping program states to non-negative reals. These transformers push a postexpectation f backward through a probabilistic program C and yield a preexpectation g, such that g represents the expected value of f after executing C. The term expectation is due to McIver & Morgan [42] and may appear somewhat misleading at first glance. For now, just note that we clearly distinguish between expectations and expected values: An expectation is hence not an expected value, per se. Instead, an expectation can rather be thought of as a random variable. [29] , [42] ). Let Vars denote the finite set of program variables and let Σ = {s | s : Vars → Q} denote the set of program states.
Definition 1 (Expectations
The set of expectations, denoted by F, is defined as 3 We consider total correctness, i.e., from any state satisfying the weakest precondition G, C definitely terminates.
postexpectation f evaluated in final states after termination of C 2 weakest preexpectation of C 2 with respect to f
weakest preexpectation of C 1 with respect to wp C 2 (f ) or in other words:
weakest preexpectation of C 1 C 2 with respect to f Fig. 1 : Backward-moving continuation-passing style weakest preexpectation transformer.
where
A partial order on F is obtained by point-wise lifting the usual order ≤ on R ≥0 , i.e.,
(F, ) is a complete lattice where suprema and infima are constructed point-wise.
We note that our notion of expectations is more general than the one of McIver & Morgan: Their work builds almost exclusively on bounded expectations, i.e., non-negative realvalued functions which are bounded from above by some constant, whereas we allow unbounded expectations. As a result, we have that (F, ) forms a complete lattice, whereas McIver & Morgan's space of bounded expectations does not.
A. Weakest Preexpectations
Given program C and postexpectation f : Σ → R ≥0 , mapping (final) states to non-negative reals, we are interested in the expected value of f , evaluated in the final states reached after termination of C. But since the behavior of C depends on its input, we are actually interested in a function g : Σ → R ≥0 that maps each initial state s 0 to the respective expected value of f evaluated in the final states reached after termination of C on input s 0 . On examining the type of g, we observe that g is again an expectation and we call it the weakest preexpectation of C with respect to the postexpectation f , denoted wp C (f ). Put as an equation, if s0 µ C is the probability (sub)measure 4 over final states reached after termination of C on initial state s 0 , then we have
As for the term expectation, note that both f and wp C (f ) are expectations of type F. But while wp C (f ) in fact represents an expected value (namely the one of f ), f itself
is the probability that s is the final state reached after termination of C on input s 0 . We have s∈Σ s 0 µ C (s) ≤ 1, where the "missing" probability mass is the probability of nontermination of C on s 0 . 5 As Σ is countable, the integral can be expressed as s∈Σ s 0 µ C (s)·f (s).
does not. In an analogy to Dijkstra's pre-and postconditions, since f is evaluated in the final states after termination of C it is called the postexpectation and since wp C (f ) is evaluated in the initial states before executing C it is called the preexpectation.
B. The Weakest Preexpectation Calculus
We now show how, given a program and a postexpectation, weakest preexpectations can be determined in a systematic and compositional manner by recapitulating the weakest preexpectation calculusà la McIver & Morgan. The calculus builds upon Kozen's probabilistic propositional dynamic logic [38] , [39] and Dijkstra's weakest precondition calculus [18] . The weakest preexpectation calculus employs expectation transformers which move backward through the program in a continuation-passing style. As a diagram, this is depicted in Fig. 1 . If we are given the sequential composition C 1 C 2 of two programs C 1 and C 2 and are interested in the expected value of some postexpectation f after executing C 1 C 2 , then we can first determine the weakest preexpectation of C 2 with respect to f , i.e., wp C 2 (f ). Thereafter, we can use the intermediate result wp C 2 (f ) as postexpectation to determine the weakest preexpectation of C 1 with respect to wp C 2 (f ). Overall, this gives the weakest preexpectation of C 1 C 2 with respect to postexpectation f .
The above explanation for sequential composition illustrates the compositional nature of the weakest preexpectation calculus. Just like for sequential composition, the weakest preexpectation transformers for all other language constructs can also be defined by induction on the program structure:
Definition 2 (The wp-Transformer [42] ). Let pGCL be the set of programs in the probabilistic guarded command language [42] . The weakest preexpectation transformer wp : pGCL → F → F is defined according to the rules given in Table I The wp-transformer satisfies a few elementary properties, which are sometimes called healthiness conditions [26] , [36] , [42] or homomorphism properties [4] : Theorem 4 (Healthiness Conditions [29] , [42] ). Let C ∈ pGCL, S ⊆ F, f, g ∈ F, and r ∈ R ≥0 . Then: 1) Continuity: wp C (sup S) = sup wp C (S) . 2) Strictness: wp C is strict, i.e., wp C (0) = 0. Here, "0" denotes the constant expectation that maps every s ∈ Σ to 0.
III. BOUNDS ON WEAKEST PREEXPECTATIONS
As we saw in Example 3, given a loop-free program C and postexpectation f , it is generally straightforward to determine wp C (f ): We simply apply the rules in Table I , which guide us along the syntax of C. For loops, on the other hand, the situation is more difficult. Often, it is not clear how to determine the corresponding least fixed point, not
(a) Style for weakest preexpectation annotations, expressing the fact that g = wp C ′ (f ) and moreover that g ′ = g. It is more intuitive to read such annotations from bottom to top. to mention that weakest preexpectations are generally not computable [32] . Therefore, we often have to content ourselves with some approximation of the least fixed point.
For us, a sound approximation is either a lower or an upper bound on the least fixed point. There are in principle two problems: (1) finding a candidate bound and (2) verifying that the candidate is indeed an upper or lower bound. In this paper, we study the latter problem.
A. Upper Bounds
The Park induction principle provides us with a very convenient proof rule for verifying upper bounds. In general, this principle reads as follows:
Theorem 5 (Park Induction [50] ). Let (D, ⊑) be a complete lattice and let Φ : D → D be continuous. 6 Then Φ has a least fixed point in D and for any I ∈ D,
In the realm of weakest precondition reasoning, by Theorem 4 (3) this immediately gives us the following induction principle:
Corollary 6 (Park Induction for wp [29] , [39] ). Let Φ f be the characteristic function of the while loop while ( ϕ ) { C } with respect to postexpectation f and let I ∈ F. Then
We call an I that satisfies Φ f (I) I a superinvariant. The striking power of Park induction is its simplicity: Once an appropriate candidate I is found (even though this is usually not an easy task), all we have to do is push it through the characteristic function Φ f once and check whether we went down in our underlying partial order. If this is the case, we have verified that I is indeed an upper bound on the least fixed point and thus on the sought-after weakest preexpectation.
Example 7 (Induction for Upper Bounds).
Consider the program C geo , given by 
which is a fixed point of Φ. In particular, Φ ω (I) is the greatest fixed point of Φ smaller or equal to I.
Dually, now let I ⊑ Φ(I). Then the sequence
is the least fixed point of Φ greater or equal to I.
The well-known Kleene Fixed Point Theorem [40] , which states that lfp Φ = Φ ω (⊥), where ⊥ is the least element of D, is a special case of the Tarski-Kantorovich Principle.
In our setting, applying the Tarski-Kantorovich principle to a superinvariant I, the iteration of Φ on I will yield some fixed point smaller than or equal to I and this fixed point is necessarily greater than or equal to the least fixed point of Φ.
B. Lower Bounds
For verifying lower bounds, we do not have a rule as simple as Park induction available. In particular, for a given complete lattice (D, ⊑) and monotonic function Φ : D → D, the rule
is unsound in general. We call an I satisfying I Φ f (I) a subinvariant and the above rule simple lower induction.
Generally, we will call an I that is a sub-or a superinvariant an invariant. I being an invariant thus expresses mainly its inductive nature, namely that I is comparable with Φ(I) with respect to the partial order .
An explanation why simple lower induction is unsound is as follows: By Theorem 8, we know from I ⊑ Φ(I) that Φ ω (I) is the least fixed point of Φ greater than or equal to I. Since Φ ω (I) is a fixed point, it is necessarily smaller than or equal to the greatest fixed point of Φ, but we do not know whether I is smaller, greater, or equal to the least fixed point of Φ. We only know that if indeed I is smaller than the least fixed point and we have I ⊑ Φ(I), then iterating Φ on I also converges to the least fixed point, i.e.,
If, however, I ⊑ Φ(I) and I is strictly greater than lfp Φ, then iterating Φ on I will yield a fixed point strictly greater than lfp Φ, contradicting soundness of simple lower induction. While we just illustrated by means of the Tarski-Kantorovich principle why the simple lower induction rule is not sound in general, we should note that the rule is not per se absurd: So called metering functions [21] basically employ simple lower induction to verify lower bounds on runtimes of nonprobabilistic programs [29] . For weakest preexpectations, however, simple lower induction is indeed unsound:
Counterexample 9 (Simple Induction for Lower Bounds). Consider the following loop C cex
where we assume that variables b and k range over the naturals. As in Example 7, the weakest preexpectation of the above loop with respect to the postexpectation b is
Let us consider
′ is a subinvariant. If the simple lower induction rule were sound, we would immediately conclude that I ′ is a lower bound on wp C cex (b), but this is obviously false since
C. Problem Statement
The purpose of this paper is to present a sound lower induction rule of the following form: Let Φ f be the characteristic function of the while loop while ( ϕ ) { C } with respect to the postexpectation f and let I ∈ F. Then
We still want our lower induction rule to be simple in the sense that checking the side conditions should be conceptually as simple as checking I Φ f (I). Intuitively, we want to apply the semantics of the loop body only finitely often, not ω times, to avoid reasoning about limits of sequences or alike. We provide such side conditions in our main contribution, Theorem 35, which transfers the Optional Stopping Theorem of probability theory to weakest preexpectation reasoning.
D. Uniform Integrability
We now present a sufficient and necessary criterion to underapproximate the least fixed points that we seek for. Let again Φ f be the characteristic function of the loop while ( ϕ ) { C } with respect to the postexpectation f , i.e.,
Theorem 4 implies that Φ f is continuous and monotonic.
Let us now consider a subinvariant I, i.e., I Φ f (I). If we iterate Φ f on I ad infinitum, then the Tarski-Kantorovich principle (Theorem 8) guarantees that we will converge to some fixed point Φ 
More generally, for any expectation X (not necessarily a subor superinvariant), if iterating Φ f on X converges to the least fixed point of Φ f , then we call X uniformly integrable for f :
Uniform integrability [24] -a notion that comes originally from probability theory -will be essential for the Optional Stopping Theorem in Section V. So far, however, we have studied the function Φ f solely from an expectation transformer point of view. Moreover, we have also defined a purely expectation-theoretical notion of uniform integrability.
In particular, we did not use any probability theory.
In Section IV, we will study Φ f from a stochastic process point of view. Stochastic processes are not inductive per se, whereas our expectation transformer approach makes heavy use of induction. We will see, however, how we can rediscover the inductiveness also in the realm of stochastic processes.
We will also see how our notion of uniform integrability corresponds to uniform integrability in its original sense. First, however, we give some preliminaries on probability theory.
IV. FROM EXPECTATIONS TO STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
In this section, we connect concepts from weakest preexpectations with notions from probability theory, like probability measures (Section IV-A), stochastic processes (Section IV-B) and the original definition of uniform integrability (Section IV-C). To that end, we introduce general definitions of these notions and instantiate them in our setting. Proofs can be found in Appendix C. For further background on probability theory, we refer to Appendix B and [9] , [24] .
Let us fix for this section an arbitrary probabilistic loop while ( ϕ ) { C }. The loop body C may contain loops but we require C to be universally almost-surely terminating (AST), i.e., C terminates on any input with probability 1. The set of all program states Σ can be uniquely split into Σ = Σ ϕ ⊎ Σ ¬ϕ , with s ∈ Σ ϕ iff s |= ϕ. The set Σ ¬ϕ thus consists of the terminal states from which the loop is not executed further.
A. Canonical Probability Space
We begin with constructing a canonical probability measure and space corresponding to the execution of our loop. As every pGCL program is, from an operational point of view, a countable Markov chain, our construction is similar to the standard construction for Markov chains (cf. [51] ).
In general, a measurable space is a pair (Ω, F) consisting of a sample space Ω and a σ-field F of Ω, which is a collection of subsets of Ω, closed under complement and countable union, such that Ω ∈ F. In our setting, a loop while ( ϕ ) { C } induces the following canonical measurable space:
as follows: The sample space Ω loop is given as
i.e., all infinite sequences of program states (so-called runs).
For ϑ ∈ Ω loop , we denote by ϑ[n] the n-th state in the sequence ϑ (starting to count at 0). The σ-field F loop is the smallest σ-field that contains all cylinder sets Cyl(π) = { πϑ | ϑ ∈ Σ ω }, for all finite prefixes π ∈ Σ + , i.e.,
Intuitively, a run ϑ ∈ Ω is an infinite sequence of states
where s 0 represents the initial state on which the loop is started and s i is a state that could be reached after i iterations of the loop. Obviously, some sequences in Ω loop may not actually be admissible by our loop. We next develop a canonical probability measure corresponding to the execution of the loop, which will assign the measure 0 to inadmissible runs.
We start with considering a single loop iteration. The loop body C induces a family of distributions
is the probability that after executing one iteration of the loop body C on s, the program is in state s ′ . In general, a probability measure over a measurable space (Ω, F) is a mapping P : F → [0, 1], such that P(∅) = 0, P(Ω) = 1, and P( i∈N A i ) = i∈N P(A i ) for any pairwise disjoint A i ∈ F. The triple (Ω, F, P) is called a probability space.
In our setting, a loop while ( ϕ ) { C } induces not only one but a family of probability measures on the loop space (Ω loop , F loop ). This family is again parameterized by the initial state in which the loop is started. Using the distributions
• µ C above, we can first define the probability of a finite non-empty prefix of a run, i.e., for ϑ ∈ Σ + , s p(ϑ) is the probability that ϑ is the sequence of states reached after the first loop iterations, when starting the loop in state s. Hence, the family
where δ s,t is the Kronecker delta, i.e., δ s,t evaluates to 1 if s = t and to 0 otherwise. Using the family • p, we now obtain a canonical probability measure on the loop space.
Lemma 13 (Loop Measure [5] ). There exists a unique family of probability measures
We now turn to random variables and their expected values. A mapping X : Ω → R ≥0 on a probability space (Ω, F, P) is called (F-)measurable or random variable if for any open set U ⊆ R ≥0 its preimage lies in F, i.e., X −1 (U ) ∈ F. If X(Ω) ⊆ N = N ∪ {∞}, then this is equivalent to checking X −1 ({n}) ∈ F for any n ∈ N. The expected value E (X) of a random variable X is defined as E (X) := Ω XdP. 8 If X takes only countably many values we have
We saw that while ( ϕ ) { C } gives rise to a unique canonical measurable space (Ω loop , F loop ) and to a family of probability measures s P parameterized by the initial state s on which our loop is started. We now define a corresponding parameterized expected value operator
• E.
Definition 14 (Expected Value for Loops
• E). Let s ∈ Σ and X : Ω loop → R ≥0 be a random variable. The expected value of X with respect to the loop measure s P, parameterized by state s, is defined by
Next, we define a random variable that corresponds to the number of iterations that our loop makes until it terminates.
Definition 15 (Looping Time). The mapping
is a random variable and called the looping time of
The canonical σ-field F loop that we defined for our loop while ( ϕ ) { C } contains runs, which are infinite sequences of states. But after n iterations of the loop we only know the first n + 1 states s 0 · · · s n of a run. Gaining knowledge in this successive fashion can be captured by a so-called filtration of the σ-field F loop . In general, a filtration is a sequence (F n ) n∈N of subsets of F, such that F n ⊆ F n+1 and F n is itself a σ-field for any n ∈ N, i.e., F is approximated from below.
is a filtration of F loop .
Next, we recall the notion of stopping times from probability theory. For a probability space (Ω, F, P) with filtration
Let us reconsider the looping time T
¬ϕ and the loop filtration (F loop n ) n∈N . In order to decide for a run ϑ = s 0 s 1 · · · ∈ Ω whether its looping time is n, we only need to consider the states s 0 · · · s n . Hence, (T ¬ϕ ) −1 ({n}) ∈ F loop n for any n ∈ N and thus T ¬ϕ is a stopping time with respect to (F loop n ) n∈N . Note that T ¬ϕ does not reflect the actual runtime of while ( ϕ ) { C }, as it does not take the runtime of the loop body C into account. Instead, T ¬ϕ only counts the number of loop iterations of the "outer loop" while ( ϕ ) { C }. This enriches the class of probabilistic programs our technique will be able to analyze, as we will not need to require that the whole program has finite expected runtime, but only that the outer loop is expected to be executed finitely often.
B. Canonical Stochastic Process
From now on, we additionally fix two expectations f, I ∈ F. Intuitively, f will later play the role of the postexpectation and I the role of an invariant (i.e., I is a sub-or superinvariant). We now present a canonical stochastic process, i.e., a sequence of random variables that captures approximating the weakest preexpectation of while ( ϕ ) { C } with respect to the postexpectation f , using the invariant I.
Definition 17 (Induced Stochastic Process). The stochastic process induced by
Now, in what sense does the stochastic process X f,I capture approximating the weakest preexpectation of our loop with respect to f by invariant I? X f,I n takes as argument a run ϑ of the loop, i.e., a sequence of states reached after each iteration of the loop body, and assigns to ϑ a value as follows: If the loop has reached a terminal state within n iterations, X f,I n returns the value of the postexpectation f evaluated in that terminal state. If no such terminal state is reached within n steps, X f,I n simply approximates the remainder of the run, i.e.,
by returning the value of the invariant I evaluated in ϑ[n+1]. We see that X f,I
n needs at most the first n + 2 states of a run to determine its value. Thus, X f,I n is not F n -measurable but F n+1 -measurable, as there exist runs that agree on the first n + 1 states but yield different images under X f,I
n . Hence, we shift the loop filtration (F loop n ) n∈N by one.
n is G loop n -measurable. The loop space, the loop measure, and the induced stochastic process X f,I are not defined by induction on the number of steps performed in the program. The loop space, for instance, contains all infinite sequences of states, whether they are admissible or not. Only the loop measure then filters out the inadmissible runs and gives them probability 0.
Reasoning by invariants and characteristic functions, on the other hand, is inductive. We will thus relate iterating the characteristic function on I to the stochastic process X f,I . For this, let Φ f again be the characteristic function of while ( ϕ ) { C } with respect to our postexpectation f , i.e.,
We now develop a first connection between the stochastic process X f,I and the characteristic function Φ f , which involves the notion of conditional expected values with respect to a σ-field, for which we provide some preliminaries here. In general, for M ⊆ Ω, the indicator function
If X is a random variable on (Ω, F, P) and G ⊆ F is a σ-field with respect to Ω, then the conditional expected value E (X | G) : Ω → R ≥0 is a Gmeasurable mapping such that for every G ∈ G the equality E (X · I G ) = E (E (X | G) · I G ) holds, i.e., restricted to the set G the conditional expected value E (X | G) and X have the same expected value. Hence, E (X | G) is a random variable that is like X, but for elements that are indistinguishable in the subfield G, it "distributes the value of X equally". Theorem 20 (Relating X f,I and Φ f ). For any n ∈ N and any s ∈ Σ, we have
Note that both sides are mappings of type
Intuitively, Theorem 20 expresses the following: Consider some cylinder Cyl(π) ∈ G loop n , i.e., π = s 0 · · · s n+1 ∈ Σ n+2 is a sequence of states of length n + 2. Then, independent of the initial state s of the loop, the average value that X f,I n+1 takes on this cylinder with respect to the measure s P coincides with the average value of X f,Φ f (I) n on that cylinder. Using Theorem 20, one can now explain in which way iterating Φ f on I represents an expected value, thus revealing the inductive structure inside the induced stochastic process:
and Iterations of Φ f ). For any n ∈ N and any s ∈ Σ, we have
represents allowing for at most n + 1 evaluations of the loop guard. For any state s ∈ Σ, the number Φ n+1 f (s) is composed of (a) f 's average value on the final states of those runs starting in s that terminate within n + 1 guard evaluations, and (b) I's average value on the (n + 2)-nd states of those runs starting in s that do not terminate within n + 1 guard evaluations. We now want to take n to the limit to consider all possible numbers of iterations of the loop body. We will see that this corresponds to evaluating the stochastic process X f,I at the time when our loop terminates, i.e., the looping time T ¬ϕ :
Definition 22 (Canonical Stopped Process). The mapping
is the stopped process, corresponding to X f,I stopped at stopping time T ¬ϕ . It satisfies
As the latter is independent of I, we write
T ¬ϕ . The stopped process now corresponds exactly to the quantity we want to reason about -the value of f evaluated in the final state after termination of our loop. For nonterminating runs we get 0, as there exists no state in which to evaluate f . We now show that the limit of the induced stochastic process X f,I corresponds to the stopped process X f T ¬ϕ . For the following lemma, note that a property α holds almost-surely in a probability space (Ω, F, P), if P ({ ϑ ∈ Ω | ϑ satisfies α }) = 1, i.e., the set of all elements of the sample space satisfying the property has probability 1.
So if while ( ϕ ) { C } is universally almost-surely terminating, then X f,I converges to X f T ¬ϕ almost-surely with respect to the measure s P for any s ∈ Σ.
Intuitively, the factor I (T ¬ϕ ) −1 (N) (ϑ) selects those runs ϑ where the looping time T ¬ϕ is finite. If the loop is AST, then this factor can be neglected, because then I (T ¬ϕ ) −1 (N) is the constant function 1 for the probability measures s P. In any case, (i.e., whether the looping time is almost-surely finite or not) the expected value of the stopped process captures precisely the weakest preexpectation of our loop with respect to the postexpectation f , since only the terminating runs are taken into account by X 
Theorem 24 captures our sought-after least fixed point as an expected value of a suitable stopped process. This is what will allow us to later apply the Optional Stopping Theorem.
C. Uniform Integrability
As we will see in Section V, uniform integrability of a certain stochastic process is the central aspect of the Optional Stopping Theorem (Theorem 29). In the probability theoretical sense, uniform integrability means that taking the expected value and taking the limit of a stochastic process commutes.
Definition 25 (Uniform Integrability of Stochastic Processes, [24, Lemma 7.10 . (3)]). Let X = (X n ) n∈N be a stochastic process on a probability space (Ω, F, P) with almost-surely existing limit lim n→ω X n . The process X is called uniformly integrable if
Note that our notion of uniform integrability of expectations from Definition 11 coincides with uniform integrability of the corresponding induced stochastic process.
Corollary 26 (Uniform Integrability of Expectations and Stochastic Processes).
Let while ( ϕ ) { C } be AST. 9 Then I is uniformly integrable for f (in the sense of Definition 11) iff the induced stochastic process X f,I is uniformly integrable (in the sense of Definition 25), i.e.,
Corollary 26 justifies the naming in Definition 11: an expectation I is uniformly integrable for f iff its induced process X f,I
is uniformly integrable. Uniform integrability is very hard to verify in general, both in the realm of stochastic processes as well as in the realm of expectation transformers. Thus, one usually tries to find sufficient criteria for uniform integrability that are easier to verify. The very idea of the Optional Stopping Theorem is to provide such sufficient criteria for uniform integrability which then allow deriving a lower bound. We will discuss these properties in the next section.
V. THE OPTIONAL STOPPING THEOREM OF WEAKEST PREEXPECTATION REASONING
We first introduce the Optional Stopping Theorem from probability theory. It builds upon the concept of submartingales. A submartingale is a stochastic process that induces a monotonically increasing sequence of its expected values.
Definition 27 (Submartingale). Let (X n ) n∈N be a stochastic process on a probability space (Ω, F, P) adapted to a filtration (F n ) n∈N of F, i.e., a sequence of random variables
It turns out that submartingales are closely related to subinvariants. In fact, I being a subinvariant (plus some side conditions) gives us that the stochastic process induced by I is a submartingale. The proofs of our results in this section can be found in Appendix D.
Lemma 28 (Subinvariant Induces Submartingale). Let I be a subinvariant, i.e., I Φ f (I), such that Φ n f (I) ≺≺ ∞ for every n ∈ N. Then the induced stochastic process X f,I is a submartingale with respect to (G loop n ) n∈N . Given a submartingale (X n ) n∈N and a stopping time T , the goal of the Optional Stopping Theorem is to prove a lower bound for the expected value of X n at the stopping time T . To this end, we define a stochastic process (X n∧T ) n∈N where for any ϑ ∈ Ω, X n∧T (ϑ) = X n (ϑ) if n is smaller than the stopping time T (ϑ) and otherwise, X n∧T (ϑ) = X T (ϑ) (ϑ).
Hence, E (lim n→ω X n∧T ) is the expected value of X n at the stopping time T . The Optional Stopping Theorem shows that the first component X 0 of the stochastic process (X n ) n∈N is a lower bound for E (lim n→ω X n∧T ) provided that (X n∧T ) n∈N is uniformly integrable. Moreover, the Optional Stopping Theorem provides a collection of criteria that are sufficient for uniform integrability of (X n∧T ) n∈N . (1), 12.4.(11), 12.5.(1), 12.5.(2), 12.5.(9)]) . Let (X n ) n∈N be a submartingale and T be a stopping time on a probability space (Ω, F, P) with respect to a filtration (F n ) n∈N . Then X ∧T = (X n∧T ) n∈N defined by
Theorem 29 (Optional Stopping
is also a submartingale w.r.t. (F n ) n∈N . If X ∧T converges almost-surely and is uniformly integrable, then
If one of the following three conditions holds, then X ∧T indeed converges almost-surely and is uniformly integrable.
(a) T is almost-surely bounded, i.e., there is a constant N ∈ N such that P (T ≤ N ) = 1.
holds almost-surely for every n ∈ N.
Our goal now is to translate the Optional Stopping Theorem from probability theory to an Optional Stopping Theorem for weakest preexpectations in order to obtain inductive proof rules for lower bounds on weakest preexpectations. So far, we have introduced the looping time T ¬ϕ (which is a stopping time w.r.t. (F loop n ) n∈N ), presented the connection of subinvariants and submartingales, and defined the concept of uniform integrability also for expectations. Hence, the only missing ingredient is a proper connection of expectations to the condition "E (|X n+1 − X n | | F n ) ≤ c" in Theorem 29 (b). To translate this concept to expectations, we require that the expectation I has a certain shape depending on the postexpectation f .
Definition 30 (Harmonization).
An expectation I is said to harmonize with f ∈ F if I is of the form
for some expectation I ′ ∈ F.
Definition 30 reflects that in terminal states t the invariant I evaluates to f (t). For an invariant I to harmonize with postexpectation f is only a minor restriction on the shape of I. It is usually easy to choose an I that takes the value of f for states in which the loop is not executed at all. Moreover, performing one iteration of Φ f obviously brings any expectation "into shape":
Corollary 31 (Harmonizing Expectations). For any J ∈ F and f ∈ F, Φ f (J) harmonizes with f .
The actual criterion that connects "E (|X n+1 − X n | | F n ) ≤ c" with the invariant I is called conditional difference boundedness (see also [12] , [20] ) and is defined as follows: We will check for conditional difference boundedness. The function H which we need for this is given by
We then check the following:
Thus, I is conditionally difference bounded by the constant 1.
Finally, we can connect the expected change of I to a property of the induced stochastic process X f,I .
Theorem 34 (Expected Change of I). Let I ≺≺ ∞ harmonize with f . Then
The stochastic process X Now Lemma 28 allows us to use the Optional Stopping Theorem from probability theory (Theorem 29) to prove a novel Optional Stopping Theorem for weakest preexpectations, which collects sufficient conditions for uniform integrability. In particular, due to Theorem 34, our Optional Stopping Theorem shows that our notion of conditional difference boundedness is an (easy-to-check) sufficient criterion for uniform integrability and hence, for ensuring that a subinvariant is indeed a lower bound for the weakest preexpectation under consideration. After stating the theorem, we will discuss the intuition of its parts in more detail. I is a lower bound, i. e.,
If one of the following three conditions holds, then I is uniformly integrable for f : Our results from this and the previous section yield the following diagram connecting the realm of stochastic processes (on the right) and the realm of expectation transformers (on the left) for a universally almost-surely terminating program. The respective Optional Stopping Theorems provide the sufficient criteria for uniform integrability, which is marked by the dashed implications. Let us elaborate on the different cases of our Optional Stopping Theorem: First of all, for deterministic terminating loops, Case (a) yields an alternative proof for the technique of so-called metering functions by Frohn et al. [21] . Also, let us briefly discuss the severity of the finiteness condition "Φ n f (I) ≺≺ ∞ for every n ∈ N". If the body C is loop-free, this condition is vacuously satisfied as I itself is finite and cannot become infinite by performing finitely many loop iterations. If C contains loops, then we can establish the finiteness condition by finding a finite superinvariant U with I U ≺≺ ∞.
In this case, we can also guarantee Φ n f (I) ≺≺ ∞.
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Case (b) is applicable whenever the outer loop is expected to be finitely often executed. In particular, this holds if the entire loop terminates positively almost-surely (i.e., within finite expected runtime).
To the best of our knowledge, Cases (a) and (b) are the first sufficiently simple induction rules for lower bounds that do not require restricting to bounded postexpectations f . While the requirements on the loop's termination behavior gradually weaken along (a) → (b) → (c), the requirements on the subinvariant I become stricter.
Finally 
Consider the bounded postexpectation f = 1, i.e., we are interested in the termination probability which is obviously 0. 11 The reason is that by Theorem 8 we have U Φ n f (U ) Φ ω f (U ) and Φ ω f (I) Φ n f (I) I for all n ∈ N. By the monotonicity of Φ f (Theorem 4), U I implies Φ ω (U ) Φ ω (I), which gives us ∞ ≻≻ U Φ ω (U ) Φ ω (I) Φ n (I). 12 Note that in this case 1 is always a subinvariant. I is a fixed point, it is also a subinvariant. Secondly, the loop is expected to be executed twice. 13 Finally, 
The corresponding characteristic function is given by
Φ 1 (X) = [¬true] · 1 + [true] · wp skip (X) = X , i.e.,
First of all, we already have Φ f (I) = I ≺≺ ∞ and since
which cannot be bounded by a constant.
Further case studies demonstrating the effectiveness of our proof rule, as well as an example that cannot be treated by Theorem 35, are provided in Appendix A.
VI. UPPER BOUNDS AND FATOU'S LEMMA We saw that Park induction for proving upper bounds does not require additional conditions such as conditional difference boundedness or even boundedness of f or I, respectively. The question arises whether this fact is also explainable using our canonical stochastic process. Indeed, the well-known Lemma of Fatou provides such an explanation. We will present a specialized variant of it which is sufficient for our purpose.
Lemma 38 (Fatou's Lemma (cf. [9, Lemma 2.7.1])). Let (X n ) n∈N be a sequence of random variables on a probability space (Ω, F, P). Then
where the lim on the left-hand-side is point-wise.
We can now reprove Park induction for wp using Fatou's Lemma: Let I be a superinvariant, i.e., Φ f (I) I. By Theorem 20, the canonical stochastic process X f,I satisfies
n .
By applying s E on both sides, we obtain
(by Theorem 24)
n · I (T ¬ϕ ) −1 (N) (by Fatou's Lemma) 13 Positive almost-sure termination itself can also be verified by Park induction, see [33] , [34] .
so I is indeed an upper bound on the least fixed point.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented new inductive proof rules (Theorem 35 (a) and (b)) for verifying lower bounds on (possibly unbounded) weakest preexpectations of probabilistic while loops using quantitative invariants. Our rules are simple in the sense that the invariants need to be "pushed through the loop semantics" only a finite number of times, much like invariants in Hoare logic. In contrast, existing rules for lower bounds of unbounded weakest preexpectations required coming up with an infinite sequence of invariants, performing induction to prove relative inductiveness of two subsequent invariants, and then -most unpleasantly -finding the limit of this sequence. Case studies demonstrating the power and limitations of our rules are found in Appendix A. Our inductive proof rules are given as an Optional Stopping Theorem (OST) for weakest preexpectation reasoning. For proving our OST, we fall back to the classical OST from probability theory. However, for most notions that appear in the classical OST like uniform integrability, we were able to find purely expectation-transformer-based counterparts. We thus conjecture that our OST can be proven in purely expectationtheoretic terms, which would most likely simplify the proof of our OST significantly as no probability theory would be required anymore.
Finally, we have investigated a measure theoretical explanation for why verifying upper bounds using domain theoretical Park induction is conceptually easier. The underlying reason is the well-known Lemma of Fatou. This leads us to speculate that Fatou's Lemma could be proved in purely domain theoretical terms, perhaps as an instance of Park induction. A successful attempt at a similar idea is due to Baranga who proved that the well-known Banach Contraction Principle is a particular instance of the Kleene Fixed Point Theorem [6] .
Further future work includes extending our proof rule for weakest preexpectation reasoning to recursive programs [49] , to the expected runtime transformer of [33] , [34] , and to probabilistic programs with nondeterminism [41] , [42] . Moreover, we are interested in (partially) automating the synthesis of the quantitative invariants needed in our proof rule. This appendix contains additional material for our paper. Appendix A presents a collection of case studies to demonstrate the strengths and the limitations of our rule. In Appendix B, we give a more detailed introduction into the required preliminaries from probability theory. Afterwards, in Appendix C, we present the proofs for Section IV. Finally, Appendix D contains the proofs of our main results in Section V.
APPENDIX A CASE STUDIES
Example 39 (Negative Binomial Loop (cf. [43] )). Let us consider the program C neg
with x, k ∈ N. The characteristic function for f = k of the program is given by
The loop is expected to be executed 2 · [x > 0] · x times, so its expected looping time is finite. Intuitively, the value of k after termination of the program is 
Since I is indeed a fixed point of Φ f , it is also a subinvariant and furthermore finite. To apply Theorem 35 (b) we need to check that I is conditionally difference bounded. We derive
So I is indeed conditionally difference bounded by 1. Hence, we can apply our new Optional Stopping Theorem (Theorem 35 (b) ) to obtain I lfp Φ f . As I is also fixed point itself, it is the least fixed point of Φ f , i.e., I = wp C neg (f ) .
Example 40 (Fair in the Limit Negative Binomial Loop). Consider the slight adaption of
with x, k ∈ N. Note that for any x > 0 we have 
Intuitively, the value of k after termination of the program should again be at least 
So I is indeed a subinvariant of Φ f and Φ f (I) ≺≺ ∞. To apply Theorem 35 (b) we need to check that I is conditionally difference bounded. 
So I is indeed a fixed point of Φ f and Φ f (I) ≺≺ ∞. To apply Theorem 35 (b) we need to check that I is conditionally difference bounded.
So I is indeed conditionally difference bounded. Hence, Theorem 35 (b) I is a lower bound on the least fixed point of Φ f . Since it is also a fixed point itself, we obtain I = wp C negncu (f ) .
Example 42 (Probabilistic Doubling with Bounded Looping Time). Let us consider the program C double
with x, y ∈ N. The characteristic function for f = y of the program is given by
The looping time of this program is [x > 0] · x which is bounded by max(s(x), 0) ∈ N for any initial state s ∈ Σ. We will
2 · y is a lower bound on the expected value of y after termination of the program.
So I is indeed a subinvariant. Furthermore, we have I Φ n f (I) ≺≺ ∞ for any n ∈ N, as the loop body is loop-free. So by using Theorem 35 (a) we can deduce that I is indeed a lower bound on the least fixed point of Φ f , i.e.,
I
wp C double (f ) .
Note that in this case Theorem 35 (b) is not applicable. I harmonizes with f , but I is not conditionally difference bounded:
which is unbounded.
Nevertheless, even in the case of finite expected looping time, Theorem 35 just provides sufficient conditions for lower bounds. This is not surprising as conditional difference boundedness is a sufficient condition for uniform integrability but far from being necessary. The following example presents a limitation of our proof rule. 
Example 43 (Probabilistic Doubling with Unbounded Looping Time). Let us consider the program
while ( a = 1 ) { { a := 0 } [ 1 /2] { b := 2 · b } } , with b ∈ N and b > 0. The characteristic function for f = b of the program is given by Φ f (X) = [a = 1] · b + [a = 1] · 1 2 · X [a/0] + X [b/2 · b] .
Now consider the sequence of invariants
which can take an arbitrary large value as there is no bound on the value of b > 0. Hence Theorem 35 (b) cannot be applied although I n is a lower bound.
APPENDIX B DETAILS ON PROBABILITY THEORY
This section is devoted to a more detailed introduction of the concepts from probability theory that we use in our work.
A. σ-Fields
When setting up a probability space over some sample space Ω, which can be any set, we have to distinguish the sets whose probabilities we want to be able to measure. The collection of these measurable sets is called a σ-field.
Definition 44 (σ-Field).
Let Ω be an arbitrary set and F ⊆ P ot(Ω). F is called a σ-field over Ω if the following three conditions are satisfied.
The pair (Ω, F) is called a measurable space. The elements of F are called measurable sets.
In the setting of program verification, we have seen that Ω is the set of all program runs. A program run is an infinite sequence of states, i.e., variable assignments. We regard σ-fields F ⊆ P ot(Ω) of the form E σ , where E is a collection of cylinder sets. (More precisely, we regard fields F n ⊆ P ot(Ω), where F n is the smallest σ-field containing all cylinder sets of order n or smaller.) In our setting, a set of runs E is a cylinder set of order n if all runs in E have the same n + 1 first configurations, and all the following configurations can be arbitrary. Let F and B be σ-fields over Ω. Then F ∩ B is a σ-field over Ω. Furthermore, if (F i ) i∈I is a family of σ-fields over Ω then so is i∈I F i .
For any set E of subsets of Ω, let E σ ⊆ F consist of all elements that are contained in all σ-fields that are supersets of E. The mapping from E to E σ is also called σ-operator.
Definition 45 (Generating σ-Fields). Let E ⊆ P ot(Ω). Then the smallest σ-field over Ω containing E is
It turns out that there is a special case in which the generated σ-field is easy to describe, namely in the case where a countable covering of the space Ω is given.
Lemma 46 (Generating σ-Fields for Covering of Ω). If
Ω = ∞ i=1 A i for a sequence A i ∈ P ot(Ω) and H := {A i | i ∈ N} σ then H = i∈J A i | J ⊆ N =:E .
Proof.
Showing that E is a σ-field is enough to prove the desired result: it contains all the sets A i and every σ-algebra containing all the A i has to contain all their countable unions, i.e., H:
This special type of a σ-field can be used to describe the elements of the σ-fields F n (cf. Definition 16) and G n (cf. Definition 18). We will discuss it in more detail in Appendix C where we use it in the proofs.
Definition 47 (Borel-Field).
If Ω = R ≥0 we use its σ-field B = B R ≥0 , the Borel-field with
In this work, we use the concept of measurable maps (or "measurable mappings"). Measurable maps are the structure-preserving maps between measurable spaces. They are defined as follows.
σ . This will become important when talking about random variables and conditional expected value.
B. Probability Spaces
So far we have only introduced the concept of measurable spaces. Intuitively, a measurable space provides the structure for defining a measure. Probability spaces are measurable space attached with a certain measure where the measure of the sample space is 1.
Definition 49 (Probability Measure, Probability Space). Let (Ω, F) be a measurable space. A map µ :
A probability measure is a measure P : F → R ≥0 with P(Ω) = 1. This implies that P(A) ∈ [0, 1] for every A ∈ F. If P is a probability measure, then (Ω, F, P) is called a probability space. In this setting a set in F is called an event.
Here, the intuition for a probability measure P is that for any set A ∈ F, P(A) is the probability that an element chosen from Ω is contained in A.
In this work we will consider properties that hold almost-surely, for example almost-sure termination or almost-sure convergence.
Definition 50 (Almost-Sure Properties). Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space and α some property, e.g., a logical formula. If A α := {ϑ ∈ Ω | ϑ α} ∈ F (i.e., it is measurable) and P (A α ) = 1 then α is said to hold almost-surely.
If a property α holds almost-surely it does not need to hold for all ϑ ∈ Ω. However, the measure P cannot distinguish A α = Ω and A α = Ω if P (A α ) = 1, so in the sense of P, almost-surely holding properties can be considered as holding globally.
C. Integrals of Arbitrary Measures
We now introduce a notion of an integral with respect to an arbitrary measure. Therefore, we fix a measurable space (Ω, F) and a measure µ. The objective is to define a "mean" of a measurable function f . The basic idea is to partition the image of f into sets A i on which f has a constant value α i . Then we compute the weighted average of the α i , where the weights are the measures of the A i . This definition is fine if f takes only finitely many values (these functions are called elementary). If f takes infinitely (countable or even uncountable) many values, we have to approximate f step by step by such functions with finite image. This yields a limit process. In this work we will only consider the cases where µ = P is a probability measure or a probability submeasure (i.e., P(Ω) ≤ 1). 
Given an elementary function, the decomposition into a linear combination of indicator functions is not unique. But to define an integral we have to guarantee that its value does not depend on the chosen decomposition. Fortunately, this can be proved:
The well-definedness is justified by Lemma 52 as it shows the independence of the chosen decomposition of the elementary function.
However, the measurable functions we use are not elementary. They take arbitrary (countably or even uncountably) many values. So we have to generalize Definition 53. It can be shown that any nonnegative measurable function is the limit of a monotonic increasing sequence of elementary functions. Before we state the properties of the integral used in this work we will define the integral on a measurable subset of Ω.
Definition 56 (Integral on Measurable Subset). Let f : Ω → R ≥0 be a nonnegative measurable function and A ∈ F. Then f · I A is nonnegative and measurable, and we define
With this definition of an integral, a very special property holds for monotonically increasing sequences of nonnegative functions: taking the limit (it always exists due to monotonicity) and the integral can be intertwined. We will focus on this when discussing uniform integrability. 
D. Random Variables
A random variable X maps elements of one set Ω to another set Ω ′ . If P is a probability measure for Ω (i.e., for A ⊆ Ω, P(A) is the probability that an element chosen from Ω is contained in A), then one obtains a corresponding probability measure P
is the probability that an element chosen from Ω is mapped by X to an element contained in A ′ . In other words, instead of regarding the probabilities for choosing elements from A, one now regards the probabilities for the values of the random variable X.
Definition 59 (Random Variable). Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space. An F − −B(R ≥0 ) measurable map X : Ω → R ≥0 is a random variable. Instead of saying "F − −B R ≥0 measurable" we simply use the notion "F-measurable". It is called discrete random variable, if its image is a countable set.
is the induced probability measure by X on (R ≥0 , B(R ≥0 )). Instead of P X (A) the notation P(X ∈ A) is common. If A = {i} is a singleton set, we also write P(X = i) instead of P X ({i}).
Definition 60 (Expected Value). Let X : Ω → R ≥0 be a random variable. Then EX := XdP.
Lemma 61 (Expected Value as Sum). If X is a discrete random variable we have E (X) = r∈R ≥0 r · P (X = r). Note that this series has only countably many nonzero nonnegative summands. Hence, it either converges or it diverges to infinity.
Hence
X dP by Lemma 58 (Additivity)
1 dP by Lemma 58 (Linearity)
r · P (X = r) .
E. Uniform Integrability
Now given any stochastic process (i.e., a sequence of random variables, X n : Ω → R ≥0 on a probability space (Ω, F, P)) that has an almost-surely existing limit the question arises whether we can construct the expectation of the limit as the limit of the expectations of the X n . However, this is false in general, a counterexample is given in [24, Introduction of 7.10]. Therefore, we distinguish stochastic processes with this special property. 
To check for uniform integrability is one of the main purposes of this work. There are two sufficient criteria which we will list below. The first one is the monotonic convergence theorem for random variables, a corollary of Theorem 57. It states that a sequence of monotonically increasing variables is always uniformly integrable. 
The second sufficient criterion states that if the sequence is bounded by an integrable random variable M , then uniform integrability is given as well. 
F. Conditional Expected Values
We introduce the notion of conditional expected value w.r.t. a sub-σ-field on a fixed probability space (Ω, F, P). The idea is that given a random variable X and a subfield G ⊆ F we would like to approximate X by another G-measurable random variable w.r.t. expectation. Intuitively, this means that we want to construct a (possibly infinite) nonnegative linear combination of the functions I G , G ∈ G, in such a way that restricted to a set G ∈ G, the random variable X and this linear combination have the same average value w.r.t. P. If the sub-σ-field has the special structure described in Lemma 46 then the just stated property just needs to be checked on the generators.
Proof. By definition it is left to show that E (X
But due to Lemma 46 it is enough to show this for any disjoint union i∈J A i . We have I i∈J Ai = i∈J I Ai and this series always converges point-wise as at most one of the summands is nonzero for any α ∈ Ω. Hence we have
Recall that E (X | G) is a random variable that is like X, but for those elements that are not distinguishable in the sub-σ-field G, it "distributes the value of X equally". This statement is formulated by the following lemma.
Lemma 67 (Expected Value Does Not Change When Regarding Conditional Expected Values). Let X be a random variable on (Ω, F, P) and let G be a sub-σ-field of F. Then
The following theorem shows (a) that linear operations carry over to conditional expected values w.r.t. sub-σ-fields, (b) that every random variable approximates itself if it is already measurable w.r.t. the sub-σ-field G, and (c) it allows to simplify multiplications with G-measurable random variables. Moreover, (d) shows how to simplify expected values with several conditions. 
APPENDIX C PROOFS FOR SECTION IV
We start this section with a crucial observation which will ease the proofs we conduct here. Reconsider the filtration (F loop n ) n∈N as presented in Definition 16. For every n ∈ N and every two distinct prefixes π = π ′ of length n + 1, their generated cylinder sets are disjoint, i.e., Cyl(π) ∩ Cyl(π ′ ) = ∅ and π∈Σ + , |π|=n+1 Cyl(π) = Ω. Therefore,
Lemma 19 (Adaptedness of Induced Stochastic Process
n is G and Φ f ). For any n ∈ N and any s ∈ Σ, we have
Note that both sides are mappings of type
Due to Lemma 66 it is enough to show (2) for the generators of G loop n , as any other set in G loop n is just a disjoint union of these generators. Hence, we prove (2) for G = Cyl(π) for a prefix run π ∈ Σ n+2 . Furthermore, if π ∈ sΣ n+1 the set Cyl(π) is a nullset and hence, (2) holds trivially. So assume that s 0 · · · s n = π ∈ sΣ n+1 and that Cyl(π) is not a nullset, i.e., s p(π) > 0.
n+1 and X f,Φ f (I) n are identical on Cyl(π), as then T ¬ϕ (ϑ) ≤ n ≤ n + 1 for all ϑ ∈ Cyl(π). So in this case (2) holds trivially, too. Hence, we assume π = s 0 · · · s n+1 ∈ Σ n ϕ Σ. We will use a case analysis to prove the desired result.
1) s n+1 ∈ Σ ¬ϕ , i.e., T ¬ϕ (ϑ) = n + 1 for all ϑ ∈ Cyl(π)
Corollary 21 (Relating Expected Values of X f,I and Iterations of Φ f ). For any n ∈ N and any s ∈ Σ, we have
Proof. Let us fix an arbitrary state s ∈ Σ. We will prove the result by induction.
• Induction base:
Proof. Let ϑ in Ω. If the program is universally almost-surely terminating (i.e., s P (T ¬ϕ < ∞) = s P (T ¬ϕ ) −1 (N) = 1 for any s ∈ Σ), then s P X 
for any π ∈ Σ n+2 and use Lemma 66 to obtain the desired result. Note that both sides of this equality are 0 if s P (Cyl(π)) = 0, so in this case the equality holds trivially.
Take any π ∈ Σ n+2 such that s P (Cyl(π)) = 0. Furthermore, as both random variables X .
We will show that the expectation of W f,I is finite, independent of the choice of s. (a) Let s ∈ Σ. Then there is an N (s) ∈ N with s P (T ¬ϕ ≤ N (s)), i.e., the looping time of while ( ϕ ) { C } is almost-surely bounded for any s ∈ Σ. So by Theorem 29 (a), X f,I is uniformly integrable for any s ∈ Σ. (b) Due to Lemma 69, I is uniformly integrable for f . Hence X f,I is uniformly integrable by Corollary 26. As X f,I is a submartingale, the result follows from Theorem 29 (b) and Theorem 34. 
